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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Cody Parmer appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to
disrr.iss his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In a prior criminal case, the state charged 20-year-old Parmer with raping
17-year old S.H. under the alternative theories of statutory and forceable rape,
and with battery with the intent to commit rape. (#39203 R., pp.60-62. 1)
At the time Parmer was charged, I. C. § 18-6101 ( 1) defined statutory rape
as sexual penetration occurring "[w]here the female is under the age of eighteen
(18) years."

I.C. § 18-6101 (1) (2009).

Prior to Parmer's trial, however, the

legislature amended LC. § 18-6101 to re-define statutory rape sexual penetration
occurring either: (1) "[w]here the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years
and the perpetrator is eighteen years of age or older" or (2) "[w]here the female is
sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age and the perpetrator is three (3) years
or more older than the female." Idaho S.L. 2010, ch. 352, § 1, eff. July 1, 201 O;
I.C. § 18-6101 (1 ), (2).
Prior to trial, Parmer moved for the dismissal of the rape charge as to the
statutory rape theory on the grounds that his alleged conduct no longer

In an order dated October 29, 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court severed the
present appeal (Case No. 41222), from Case No. 41434. In the same order the
Court took judicial notice, in Case No. 41434, of the clerk's record and reporter's
transcript from Parmer's prior appeal, Case No. 39203. Contemporaneously with
the filing of this brief, the state files a motion for the Court to also take judicial
notice, in Case No. 41222, of the clerk's record and reporter's transcript from
Case No. 39203.
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constituted statutory rape under Idaho law. 2 (#39203 R., pp.76-78.) In denying
the motion, the district court primarily relied on LC.§ 67-513, which provides that
the repeal of a criminal law does not constitute a bar to the prosecution and
punishment of an act committed in violation of the law while it was still in effect,
unless a contrary intention is expressly declared in the repealing act. (#39203
R., pp.153-159.)

After a trial, the jury acquitted Parmer of rape, but found him guilty of
battery with the intent to commit rape. (#39203 R., pp.249-250.) Parmer then

filed a motion for a new trial asserting that the jury instructions were erroneous
because they permitted the jury to find that Parmer was guilty of battery with
intent to commit statutory rape. (#39203 R., pp.265-271.) This instruction was
erroneous, Parmer asserted, because battery with intent to commit statutory rape
is an invalid legal theory, in that statutory rape, unlike forceable rape, does not
include battery as a "manner and means" by which one commits the crime. (Id.)
The district court denied the motion. (#39203 R., pp.287-296.)
The district court imposed a unified term of fifteen years with six years
fixed but suspended the sentence and retained jurisdiction. (#39203 R., pp.302304.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed

Parmer on probation. See See State v. Parmer, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No.

665, Docket No. 39203, p.2 (Idaho App., September 17, 2013).
Parmer filed a direct appeal of his conviction, but did not raise issues
relating to the legislature's amendment of I.C. § 18-6101, or to the jury

2

Parmer is 2 years, 7 months, and 19 days older than S.H. (See #39203 R.,
p.77.)

2

instructions.

Parmer 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 665.

asserted only that the prosecutor committed misconduct
Appeals affirmed Parmer's conviction .3

kl

Instead, Parmer
The Idaho Court of

kl

!n 2012, the state charged Parmer with failure to register as a sex offender
for failing to provide written notice of a change of address.

(R., pp.25-26.)

Parmer filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asserting, among other grounds,
that he had no duty to register as a sex offender because his underlying crimina,I
conviction for battery with intent to rape was invalid. (R., pp.34-40.) Specifically,
Parmer asserted again that the legislature's amendment to I.C. § 18-6101, which
redefined statutory rape, precluded his conviction for battery with intent to commit
rape. (!d.) The district court denied Parmer's motion.

(R., pp.53-55, 59-60.)

Parmer then entered a conditional guilty plea to failure to register as a sex
offender, preserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
dismiss. (R., pp.56-58, 61-63, 66.) The district court imposed a unified five-year
sentence with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.70-72.) Parmer timely appealed. (R., pp.73-76.)

The Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion affirming Palmer's conviction for battery
with intent to commit rape was filed after Parmer was sentenced for failure to
register as a sex offender.
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ISSUES

Parmer's

court abuse its
to dismiss?

when it

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Parmer failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
Parmer Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Parmer contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to

dismiss his charge of failing to register as a sex offender.

(See generally.

Appellant's brief.) Specifically, he contends that the battery with intent to commit
rape conviction underlying his registration requirement is invalid, and he
therefore had no duty to register as a sex offender as a matter of law.

(Id.)

Parmer's contention fails because he has not established either a basis for
expungement of his duty to register as a sex offender, or that his underlying
conviction for battery with intent to commit rape is invalid.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the

application and construction of statutes. State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 803,
172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d
121,122 (1990).

C.

Parmer's Conviction For Battery With The Intent To Commit Rape
Required Him To Register As A Sex Offender
tdaho Code § 18-8304 of the Sexual Offender Registration Notification

and Community Right-To-Know Act compels individuals who have been
convicted of certain enumerated crimes to register as sex offenders.

5

Included

within this list of crimes is I.C. § 18-911, battery with intent to commit rape,
infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct. l.C. § 18-8304.
In denying Parmer's motion to dismiss, the district court correctly
concluded that because Parmer had been convicted of battery with intent to
commit rape, he was required to register as a sex offender.

(R., pp.53-55, 59-

60.)
The district court's decision was correct for several reasons.

First, the

Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-To-Know Act
does not provide any grounds for relief from the sex offender registration
requirements that are applicable to Parmer. Second, Parmer is not permitted to
collaterally attack his battery with intent to commit rape conviction that was the
basis of his duty to register as a sex offender.

Third, even if Parmer were

permitted to collaterally attack his battery with intent to commit rape conviction,
he cannot show that the conviction is somehow invalid.
Neither the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community
Right-To-Know Act itself, nor any other authority cited by Parmer, permit him to
collaterally attack his battery with intent to commit rape conviction in the context
of his subsequent failure to register as a sex offender case. The Sexual Offender
Registration Notification and Community Right-To-Know Act, I.C. §§ 18-8301 to
18-8331, provides only two express means by which an offender may be
relieved of his duty to register as a sex offender.

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8310,

offenders who are not recidivists, have not been convicted of aggravated
offenses, and have not been designated as violent sexual predators, may, after

6

ten years from the date the offender was released from incarceration, petition to
the court to be exempted from further registration. Pursuant to LC.§ 18-8310A
offenders convicted of statutory rape for conduct that would no longer constitute
statutory rape foilowlng the 2010 legislative amendment to I.C. § 18-6101 may, in
some circumstances, petition the court to be exempted from further registration. 4
"Only compliance with l.C. § 18-8310 releases a defendant from the reporting
requirements of the registration act, and to decide differently would "contravene
the express language of LC.§ 18-8304(3)." State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306,
309-310, 142 P.3d 729, 722-723 (2006) (citing State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 21,
13 P.3d 344, 344 (Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting Robinson's argument that the district
court's dismissal of his underlying sex offense conviction pursuant to I.C. § 192604(1) relieved him of his duty to register as a sex offender).
While the Idaho appellate courts have not specifically addressed whether
individuals may collaterally attack prior sex offense convictions in order to
challenge their sex offender registration requirement, the United States Supreme
Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have precluded collateral attacks in similar
contexts. In Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994), the United States
Supreme Court held that a defendant's due process right to collaterally attack a

4

The opportunity for exemption provided by Idaho Code § 18-831 0A was
formerly codified as I.C. § 18-8304(4) (2009). In his motion to dismiss his failure
to register charge, Parmer argued that I.C. § 18-8304(4) applied to offenders
convicted of battery with intent to commit rape where statutory rape is one of the
alternative theories of the rape charge. (R., pp.38-40.) Parmer has not pursued
this argument on appeal. In any event, the state submits that a plain language
reading of I.C. § 18-8310A and the former I.C. § 18-8304(4), which both
reference only rape, preclude an application of that statute to a conviction for
battery with intent to commit rape, a crime which is not referenced in either
statute.
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conviction used for enhancement purposes in a subsequent proceeding is limited
to the singular constitutional defect of failure to appoint counsel. lct..c at 496. In
State v. \/Varren 135 Idaho 836, 840-841, 25 P.3d 859, 863-864 (Ct. App. 2001)
and State v. VVeber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 414 (2004) the Idaho appellate courts
adopted the Custis holding.
The reasoning behind Custis, Warren, and Weber applies to the present
case.

In adopting Custis, the Idaho Court of Appeals referenced the policy

concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court and recognized that
determination of collateral attacks on prior convictions would require courts to
"rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state court
transcripts or records that may date from another era, and may come from any
one of the 50 States." Warren, 135 Idaho at 841, 25 P.3d at 864. Additionally,
the Court reasoned:
The interest in promoting the finality of judgments provides
additional support for our constitutional conclusion. As we have
explained, "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine
confidence in the integrity of our procedures" and inevitably delay
and impair the orderly administration of justice. (Citations omitted).
By challenging the previous conviction, the defendant is asking a
district court "to deprive [the] [state court judgment] of [its] normal
force and effect in a proceeding that ha[s] an independent purpose
other than to overturn the prior judgmen[t]." (Citation omitted).

Likewise, permitting offenders to collaterally attack the underlying sex
offense that brought about the registration duty would be unreasonably
burdensome. Such attacks on convictions are better suited for direct appeals,
particularly in this case, where the direct appeal of Parmer's battery with intent to

8

commit rape conviction was stiil pending whi!e Parmer was attempting to
collaterally attack the same conviction in the context of his failure to register
case.

Parmer could have chosen to raise grounds re,ated to the legislative

amendment of LC.§ 18-6101 on direct appeal of his battery with intent to commit
rape conviction.
Further, even if Parmer were permitted to attempt to collaterally attack his
battery with intent to commit rape conviction in the context of his subsequent
failure to register charge, he cannot show that the underlying conviction was
somehow invalid. LC. § 67-513 provides that "the repeal of any law creating a
criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the prosecution and punishment of
an act already committed in violation of the law so repealed, unless the intention
to bar such prosecution and punishment is expressly declared in the repealing
act" The 2010 legislative amendment to I.C. § 18-6101 contains no language
barring such prosecutions and punishments. Therefore, even if the jury in the
underlying case found that Parmer committed battery with intent to commit

statutory rape, the conviction is still valid because the charged conduct
constituted statutory rape at the time Parmer committed the act
Parmer has failed to establish either any basis for an expungement of his
requirement to register as a sex offender, or that his underlying conviction for
battery with intent to commit rape is invalid. He has therefore failed to show that
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his charge for failure to
register as a sex offender.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Parmer's motion to dismiss.
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2014.

MARK VV. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of January, 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BEN PATRICK McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~0_C:-.,_
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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